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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The United States filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Union alleging Clean Water 
Act (CWA) violations on behalf of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) against Moon Moo 
Farm. Deep Quod Riverwatcher, an environmental organization, 
and its member Dean James (collectively “Riverwatcher”) 
intervened. Riverwatcher asserted both an additional CWA claim 
and two claims under the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA). Moon Moo crossclaimed for common law trespass 
based on Riverwatcher’s conduct before suit. On April 21, 2014, 
the district court granted Moon Moo’s motion for summary 
judgment dismissing the CWA and RCRA claims and ruling in its 
favor on the trespass claim. The district court’s order is final, and 
jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 
I.  Whether Moon Moo Farm requires a permit under the 
Clean Water Act NPDES permitting program because it is a point 
source under the statute. 
II.  Whether Moon Moo Farm can be subject to a citizen 
suit under RCRA because its application of manure and whey to 
its fields qualifies as solid waste disposal and, if so, whether that 
conduct creates an imminent and substantial threat of harm to 
human health. 
III.  Whether the Queechunk Canal, a man-made water 
body, is a public trust navigable water of the State of New Union 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/5
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allowing for a public right of navigation despite private 
ownership of the banks on both side and the bottom of the canal 
by Moon Moo Farm. 
IV.  If the canal is not a public trust navigable water, 
whether evidence obtained through trespass and without a 
warrant is admissible in a civil enforcement proceeding brought 
under CWA §§ 309(b), (d) and 505. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the District Court for the District of 
New Union’s grant of summary judgment against EPA and 
Riverwatcher. (R. 4). In its complaint, EPA asserted that Moon 
Moo Farm violated the CWA’s permitting provisions—33 U.S.C. § 
1311(a), 1319(b), 1319(d) and 1342. (R. 4). EPA alleged that Moon 
Moo was subject to NPDES permitting due to discharges 
resulting from Moon Moo’s application of manure and whey to its 
field. (R. 7–8). Riverwatcher intervened, asserting both CWA and 
RCRA claims. (R. 4). Riverwatcher claimed that Moon Moo’s 
conduct both qualified as open dumping under RCRA and created 
an “imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or 
the environment.” (R. 10) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) 
(2012)). Moon Moo crossclaimed against Riverwatcher, asserting 
Dean James trespassed on private property to obtain evidence. 
Moon Moo sought both damages and injunctive relief. (R. 7). 
All three parties sought summary judgment on the 
environmental claims after discovery, and Moon Moo sought 
summary judgment on its trespass claim. Id. The district court 
granted Moon Moo’s motions and denied plaintiffs’ motions. (R. 
12). It held that Moon Moo was not a CAFO because James 
obtained evidence related to that issue through trespass; the 
evidence was therefore not admissible. (R. XX). The court 
awarded Moon Moo $ 832,560 in damages. (R. XX). Next, it 
concluded that land application of manure and whey is not solid 
waste disposal, defeating both RCRA claims. (R. 10). Even if the 
amendments were solid waste, the court held that Riverwatcher 
3
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produced insufficient evidence to establish imminent and 
substantial endangerment. (R. 11). 
The United States (on behalf of EPA), Deep Quod 
Riverwatcher, and Dean James all filed Notices of Appeal 
challenging all three aspects of the court’s decision. (R. 1). 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Moon Moo Farm is a dairy farm with 350 head of cows in the 
State of New Union. (R. 4). It houses the cows in a barn and 
collects and stores their manure and liquid waste in an outdoor 
lagoon for use as fertilizer. (R. 4–5). Moon Moo designed its 
lagoon to withstand a 25-year rainfall event. (R. 5). Moon Moo 
spreads the manure over 150 acres of fields that grow Bermuda 
grass, which it uses for silage. Id. In 2010, Moon Moo increased 
its herd from 170 to the current 350 cows in an effort to meet 
increased demand for milk from the nearby Chokos Greek Yogurt 
processing facility. Id. For the past two years, Chokos has given 
Moon Moo acid whey produced by the plant, which Moon Moo 
adds to its lagoons and includes in the mixture sprayed on its 
fields. Id. 
Moon Moo farm is located at a bend in the Deep Quod River. 
Id. To alleviate flooding, a previous farm owner constructed a 
bypass canal through the middle of the farm, known as the 
Queechunk Canal. Id. The canal, owned on both sides by Moon 
Moo and prominently posted with “No Trespassing” signs, is fifty 
yards wide, three to four feet deep, and can be navigated by a 
canoe or other small boat. Id. Despite the signs, the canal is 
commonly used as a shortcut up and down the Deep Quod, which 
flows year round, can be navigated by small boat, and runs into 
the Mississippi River. Id. The river also serves as a drinking 
water source for the downstream community of Farmville. Id. 
New Union regulates Moon Moo as a “no-discharge” animal 
feeding operation. (R. 6). Because of this designation, Moon Moo 
must submit a Nutrient Management Plan (NMP) to the 
Farmville Regional Office of the State of New Union Department 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/5
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of Agriculture (DOA). (R. 5). The NMP regulates manure 
application rates based on a calculation of expected nutrient 
uptake by Moon Moo’s crops. Id. Although New Union has 
authorization to issue CWA permits, Moon Moo does not hold a 
permit issued pursuant to the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES). (R. 5–6). 
In early 2013, Deep Quod Riverwatcher, a nonprofit 
organization, received complaints that the river smelled of 
manure and was an unusual brown color. (R. 6). Around this 
time, the Farmville Water Authority (FWA) issued a nitrate 
advisory for its drinking water customers citing high levels of 
nitrates and fecal coliforms. Id. The advisory suggested that 
customers use bottled water for infant consumption, but also 
informed them that the water posed no risk to adults. Id. 
In response to the complaints, Dean James investigated the 
river in a small outboard watercraft on April 12, 2013. Id. 
Between April 11 and 12, two inches of rain fell in the region, a 
significant storm event, but one far short of the five inches of rain 
in 24 hours needed to constitute a 25-year event. Id. James 
ignored the “No Trespassing” signs and entered the Queechunk 
Canal, where he photographed manure-spreading operations on 
Moon Moo’s property and discolored brown water flowing from 
the fields into a drainage ditch. Id. James took samples of the 
ditch water as it entered the canal. Id. James later had the 
samples tested by a water-testing laboratory; tests showed 
elevated levels of nitrates and fecal coliforms. Id. 
Moon Moo applies manure and whey to its fields in 
accordance with its NMP. Id. Riverwatcher submitted expert 
testimony to suggest that a low pH of 6.1 caused by the addition 
of acid whey to the manure mixture prevented the Bermuda grass 
from absorbing nutrients effectively, causing excess nutrients to 
be released into the Queechunk Canal. Id. Riverwatcher’s expert 
also stated that spreading manure during a rain event would 
nearly always result in excess runoff. Moon Moo’s NMP does not 
forbid such a practice. (R. 6, 7). Further, application of whey as a 
soil conditioner has been a traditional practice in New Union for 
decades. (R. 6). 
It is also true that, because the Deep Quod River watershed 
is heavily farmed, nitrate advisories have been issued five times 
since 2002. (R. 7). These advisories predate Moon Moo’s increase 
5
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in operations and use of whey on its farm. Id. Another expert 
testifying on Riverwatcher’s behalf stated that it was impossible 
to say for sure that runoff from Moon Moo Farm was the “but for” 
cause of the 2013 nitrate advisory. Id. 
 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The district court granted Moon Moo’s motion for summary 
judgment. This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo, “viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party.” Roberts v. Printup, 422 F.3d 
1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Moon Moo Farm is not subject to NPDES permitting because 
it does not discharge pollutants into navigable waters of the 
United States via a point source. Moon Moo does not qualify as a 
point source because its discharges are agricultural stormwater 
runoff, which the CWA explicitly excludes from the definition of a 
point source. 
The district court also correctly concluded that Moon Moo did 
not violate RCRA. RCRA’s plain text decries Riverwatcher’s 
assertion that application of soil amendments constitutes solid 
waste disposal. Congress did not intend to regulate the use of soil 
amendments under RCRA. Case law supports Moon Moo’s belief 
that, by enhancing its farm’s productive use, it was not engaging 
in waste disposal. Even if the soil amendments qualify as solid 
waste, Riverwatcher failed to produce sufficient evidence to tie 
recent nitrate advisories in Farmville to Moon Moo’s conduct. 
The Queechunk Canal is not a public trust navigable water 
because it is not navigable in its natural state and has no public 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/5
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right of access. Consequently, the district court properly excluded 
evidence obtained through trespass. James’s water sample is also 
inadmissible because it broke the evidentiary chain of custody. 
 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. MOON MOO FARM DOES NOT REQUIRE A 
PERMIT UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
NPDES PERMITTING PROGRAM BECAUSE IT IS 
NOT A POINT SOURCE OF POLLUTION UNDER 
THE STATUTE. 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) generally prohibits the 
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters of the United 
States. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012). However, the CWA allows for 
pollution from a point source when the pollution activity complies 
with the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permit program. Id. § 1342. 
The CWA defines a “pollutant” to include “industrial, 
municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.” Id. § 
1362(6). The CWA defines a “point source” as: 
any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but 
not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, 
discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal 
feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged . . . 
Id. § 1362(14). The definition also states that a point source “does 
not include agricultural stormwater discharges.” Id. The CWA 
does not define the terms “concentrated animal feeding operation” 
or “agricultural stormwater discharge.” See id. § 1362. 
  Moon Moo Farm does not require a NPDES permit because 
it does not discharge pollutants into navigable waters of the 
United States via a point source. Instead, Moon Moo’s discharges 
are agricultural stormwater runoff, which the CWA explicitly 
excludes from the definition of a point source. Id. § 1362(14). 
7
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A. Moon Moo Farm is not a CAFO, which means it is 
not subject to NPDES permitting by virtue of a 
discharge from a CAFO manure land application 
area. 
EPA’s CAFO rule addresses pollution discharges resulting 
from land application activities by CAFOs. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e) 
(2014). The rule states the following: 
 
[t]he discharge of manure . . . to waters of the United States 
from a CAFO as a result of the application of that manure . . . 
by the CAFO to land areas under its control is a discharge 
from that CAFO subject to NPDES permit requirements, 
except where it is an agricultural stormwater discharge as 
provided by 33 U.S.C. 1362(14). 
Id. The rule then states that when discharges from CAFO land 
applications are conducted in accordance with specified nutrient 
management practices, the discharges are considered agricultural 
stormwater (thereby being exempt from NPDES permitting). Id. 
According to section 122.23(b)(2), a CAFO is a particular type 
of animal feeding operation (AFO). Id. § 122.23(b)(2). An AFO is 
considered a CAFO when it either satisfies the criteria of a 
Medium or Large CAFO or when it is designated as a CAFO 
through a process provided by the regulation. Id. The criteria for 
a Large CAFO are based strictly on the number of animals. Id. § 
122.23(b)(4). Moon Moo Farm is not a Large CAFO because its 
350 cow dairy herd is far below the minimum 700 mature dairy 
cows or 1,000 other cattle required. Also, Moon Moo is not a 
designated CAFO because the farm has not been designated as a 
CAFO through the process outlined in section 122.23(c). 
The criteria for a Medium CAFO are based both on the 
number of animals and one of the following conditions: 
 
Pollutants are discharged into waters of the United States 
through a man-made ditch, flushing system, or other similar 
man-made device; or 
 
Pollutants are discharged directly into waters of the United 
States which originate outside of and pass over, across, or 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/5
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through the facility or otherwise come into direct contact with 
the animals confined in the operation. 
Id. § 122.23(b)(6)(ii). 
Moon Moo is not a Medium CAFO because it does not satisfy 
either of the two  pollution conditions.1 Id. § 122.23(b)(6)(ii). The 
second condition is not satisfied because there is no claim that 
“waters of the United States which originate outside of and pass 
over, across, or through the facility or otherwise come into direct 
contact” with Moon Moo’s animals. Id. § 122.23(b)(6)(ii)(B). 
The first condition requires that the AFO discharge 
pollutants into waters of the United States through a man-made 
ditch, flushing system, or other similar man-made device. This 
condition is not satisfied because the only man-made ditch 
identified is located exclusively on land outside the boundaries of 
Moon Moo’s AFO. According to 40 CFR 122.23, an AFO is: 
 
a lot or facility . . . where the following conditions are met: (i) 
Animals . . . have been, are, or will be stabled or confined and 
fed or maintained for a total of 45 days or more in any 12–
month period, and (ii) Crops, vegetation, forage growth, or 
post-harvest residues are not sustained in the normal growing 
season over any portion of the lot or facility. 
Id. § 122.23(b)(1). Based on the plain meaning of the AFO 
definition, Moon Moo Farm contains an AFO (its dairy operation) 
as well as a 150-acre field of Bermuda grass that is not an AFO. 
(R. 5). The field does not meet the definition of an AFO because 
(1) animals are not stabled or confined on the field, and (2) crops 
and vegetation, specifically Bermuda grass, are sustained 
throughout the field during the normal growing season. See id. 
Because the only alleged ditch is located exclusively within the 
 
1.In addition, the record is inconclusive as to whether Moon Moo’s herd contains 
the requisite number of animals to qualify as a Medium CAFO. Moon Moo Farm 
currently has a 350 cow milking herd. (R. 5). A herd of milking cows consists of 
calves, immature females (heifers), and mature dairy cows. Ag 101—Lifecycle 
Production Phases, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/ag101/dairyphases.html. The record does not 
indicate the specific composition of the herd, which means it has not been 
established that Moon Moo’s milking herd consists of either the 200–699 mature 
dairy cows or 300–999 other cattle required for Moon Moo to be a Medium 
CAFO. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(6)(i)(A); Id. § 122.23(b)(6)(i)(C). 
9
  
130 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE  [Vol.  6 
 
 
field, (R. 6), there is no evidence that the AFO itself has 
discharged pollutants through a man-made ditch, flushing 
system, or other similar man-made device as required by section 
122.23(b)(6)(ii)(A). 
The situation would be different if the AFO independently 
qualified as a CAFO because a CAFO is a point source, and it is 
well established that land appurtenant to a point source facility is 
part of the point source facility. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2; Alt v. EPA, 
979 F. Supp. 2d 701, 713 (N.D. W. Va. 2013). But unlike a CAFO, 
an AFO is not listed as a point source in the CWA and therefore 
is not a point source unless it has a “discernible, confined, and 
discrete conveyance.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012). The ditch wholly 
within the field adjacent to the AFO cannot make Moon Moo’s 
AFO a point source because land appurtenant to the AFO is not 
part of the AFO facility until the AFO independently qualifies as 
a point source. This means that for the dairy operation to meet 
the first pollution condition, the operation itself would need to 
discharge pollutants through a ditch. Because there is no 
evidence of a ditch from the production area, the dairy operation 
cannot be deemed a Medium CAFO because it does not satisfy 
either of the two conditions in section 122.23(b)(6)(ii).2 
It might be argued that according to Waterkeeper, the 
discharges located in the field adjacent to the AFO are actually 
discharges from the AFO itself. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 
399 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2005). Waterkeeper involved a challenge to 
EPA’s CAFO rule, focusing in part on the rule’s land application 
provisions (section 122.23(e)).3 Id. at 506-11. Industry groups 
argued that the land application provisions in effect regulated 
“uncollected” discharges because the provisions would apply 
regardless of whether the discharges were ultimately channeled 
 
 2. The “production area” is defined by section 122.23(b)(8) to include the 
animal confinement area, the manure storage area, the raw materials storage 
area, and the waste containment areas, each of which are defined by 
122.23(b)(8). 
 3. The CAFO rule has been revised three times since the 2003 version 
challenged in Waterkeeper, but the land application provisions in 122.23 (e) that 
the court analyzed in Waterkeeper have remained the same. Compare 40 C.F.R. 
§ 122.23(e) (2003), and id. § 122.23(e) (2006), and id. § 122.23(e) (2007), and id. 
§ 122.23(e) (2008), with id. § 122.23(e) (2014). The part of 122.23(e) that has 
changed since 2003 is the addition of 122.23(e)(i) and 122.23(ii). Compare id. § 
122.23(e) (2003), with id. § 122.23(e) (2014). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/5
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through a discrete conveyance. See id. at 510. According to the 
industry groups, regulation of these “uncollected” discharges 
would mean EPA was regulating a non-point source under 
NPDES, which is unauthorized under the CWA. See id. The 
Second Circuit rejected that argument, concluding, “regardless of 
whether or not runoff is collected at the land application area . . . 
any discharge from a land area under the control of a CAFO is a 
point source discharge subject to regulation because it is a 
discharge from a CAFO.” Id. The court explained that because the 
CAFO is both a point source and the “proximate cause” of the 
discharge, any discharge from the land application area can be 
classified as “a discharge from the CAFO that can be regulated as 
a point source discharge.” Id; see also Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration 
of the Env’t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 
2002) (applying similar reasoning to a similar scenario). 
Waterkeeper is inapplicable to the question of whether Moon 
Moo’s AFO is a Medium CAFO by virtue of its land applications. 
In Waterkeeper, the court assumed that the animal production 
operations were CAFOs before considering whether uncollected 
discharges from those operations’ land application activities could 
be regulated. See id. at 506-11. The court reached its conclusion 
on the uncollected discharge question by (1) observing that 
CAFOs themselves are point sources, and (2) reasoning that 
discharges from a CAFO’s land application activities are 
essentially discharges from the CAFO itself. See id. at 510-11. 
Therefore, Waterkeeper cannot be used to determine whether the 
discharges located in the field adjacent to the AFO are discharges 
from the AFO itself without first answering the prerequisite 
question of whether Moon Moo operates a CAFO. 
In summary, Moon Moo is not a Large CAFO because it does 
not contain the minimum number of animals required by section 
122.23(b)(4). Moon Moo is not a designated CAFO because there 
is no evidence that it has been designated through the process 
outlined in section 122.23(c). Lastly, Moon Moo is not a Medium 
CAFO because any discharge of pollutants through a man-made 
ditch occurs on land that does not comprise an AFO. Because 
section 122.23 only applies to CAFOs and Moon Moo Farm is not 
a CAFO, Moon Moo is not subject to NPDES permitting for 
discharges from a CAFO manure land application area under 
section 122.23(e). 
11
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B.   Moon Moo Farm’s land application discharges are 
exempt from NPDES permitting as agricultural 
stormwater discharges. 
1.    As a Non-CAFO, Moon Moo’s nutrient 
discharges from its manure application fields 
are agricultural stormwater discharges that 
are not subject to NPDES permitting. 
The CWA states that agricultural stormwater discharges are 
not a point source of pollution, which means they are not subject 
to NPDES permitting. 33 U.S.C. § 1342, § 1362(14) (2012). But 
neither the CWA nor EPA regulations provide a general 
definition of an agricultural stormwater discharge.4 This has led 
to confusion in the context of AFOs because discharges resulting 
from AFO activities can share characteristics of both a point 
source discharge (subject to NPDES permitting) and an 
agricultural stormwater discharge (not subject to NPDES 
permitting). EPA has clarified the boundaries between a point 
source discharge and a stormwater runoff discharge when a 
CAFO facility applies waste to land under its control. See 40 
C.F.R. § 122.23(e) (2014). But EPA has not issued regulations 
that clarify the boundaries between point sources and 
agricultural stormwater in other contexts, such as for AFOs that 
do not qualify as CAFOs. In contexts other than land application 
activities from CAFOs, courts must interpret the plain meaning 
of agricultural stormwater runoff based on its “ordinary meaning 
in accordance with common usage.” Alt v. EPA, 979 F. Supp. 2d 
701, 710-11 (N.D. W. Va. 2013) (citing BP v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 
91, 127 (2006)). 
The plain meaning of agricultural stormwater was analyzed 
in Southview Farm. Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v. 
Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994). In Southview Farm, 
the Second Circuit assessed whether a reasonable jury could have 
 
 4. At most, EPA provides some examples of agricultural stormwater 
discharges in section 122.3(e) by saying that NPDES permits are not required 
for “any introduction of pollutants from non point-source agricultural and 
silvicultural activities, including storm water runoff from orchards, cultivated 
crops, pastures, range lands, and forest lands, but not discharges from 
concentrated animal feeding operations as defined in § 122.23….” 40 C.F.R. § 
122.3(e) (2014). 
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found that discharges from a CAFO’s land application activities 
were exempted as agricultural stormwater.5 Id. The court framed 
the issue as “not whether the discharges occurred during rainfall 
or were mixed with rain water run-off, but rather, whether the 
discharges were the result of precipitation [in which case they 
would be considered agricultural stormwater].” Id. at 120-21; see 
also Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d 701 (citing Southview Farm when 
finding that a CAFO’s non-land application discharge was 
exempted as agricultural stormwater because it resulted from 
precipitation). The court held that a reasonable jury could find 
that the CAFO discharges “were not the result of rain, but rather 
simply occurred on days when it rained,” meaning the discharges 
fell outside of the agricultural exemption. See Southview Farm, 
34 F.3d at 121. In reaching its decision, the court cited testimony 
from numerous eyewitnesses. One witness stated that after the 
farm spread manure, the manure “had pooled in the corner of 
their field right next to our property . . . larger than I had seen 
before, and it had been pooled there, and then it rained . . . [t]hen 
it drizzled into the ditch and through the drainage pipe.” Id. 
Another witness stated that “a lot of manure [was] coming off the 
field through the areas where the banks had fallen away.” Id. 
Based on the ordinary meaning of the term agricultural 
stormwater runoff, as properly discerned by the Second Circuit in 
Southview Farm, Moon Moo’s discharges are agricultural 
stormwater runoff because they resulted from precipitation 
events. In Southview Farm, the key testimony that permitted the 
Second Circuit to let the verdict against the CAFO stand stated 
that the manure itself was being directly discharged into waters 
of the United States. Witnesses saw pools of liquid manure 
standing in the field before it rained, and then after it rained said 
that “a lot of manure [was] coming off the field” in places where 
the banks had fallen away. Id. In other words, the discharges 
were found not to be “result of precipitation,” but rather direct 
discharges of manure that occurred contemporaneously to a rain 
event. This direct discharge presumably resulted from soil erosion 
that created a conduit for the standing liquid manure to enter the 
 
 5. This was before EPA promulgated 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e), which clarified 
when a CAFO’s land application discharges are considered agricultural 
stormwater runoff. 
13
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nearby waters, as supported by the witness testimony of the 
manure “coming off the field through the areas where the banks 
had fallen away.” Id. 
In contrast, there is no evidence of direct manure discharges 
here. James states that he observed and photographed “manure 
spreading operations taking place” during a rain event. (R. 6). He 
also observed and photographed “discolored brown water flowing 
from the fields,” which laboratory tests found to have elevated 
levels of nitrates and fecal coliforms. Id. But James simply 
describes a paradigm example of agricultural stormwater runoff 
resulting from precipitation. Brown colored water is exactly what 
one would expect to be draining from a dirt field after a rain 
event. James’s observation that manure spreading operations 
were occurring on the same day as the brown discharges might 
help to identify the source of the pollution in the stormwater 
runoff (manure spreading operations). But unlike the witnesses 
in Southview Farm, James never stated that he actually saw 
manure collecting on the field or directly discharging into the 
river. Absent any evidence to the contrary, common sense dictates 
that the precipitation event between April 11 and 12 caused 
nutrients from Moon Moo’s land application activities to be 
discharged into the canal. Therefore, based on the ordinary 
meaning of agricultural stormwater discharge, the discharges 
from Moon Moo Farm are exempt from NPDES permitting. 
2.    Even if Moon Moo were assumed to be a CAFO, 
nutrient discharges from its manure 
application fields would be agricultural 
stormwater discharges exempt from NPDES 
permitting. 
As stated above, section 122.23(e) of the CAFO rule states 
that discharges resulting from land application activities by a 
CAFO to land under its control are subject to NPDES permitting 
requirements unless they qualify as agricultural stormwater 
discharges. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e) (2014). Section 122.23(e) then 
states: 
 
where the manure . . . has been applied in accordance with 
site specific nutrient management practices that ensure 
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appropriate agricultural utilization of the nutrients in the 
manure . . . as specified in § 122.42(e)(1)(vi)-(ix), a 
precipitation-related discharge of manure . . . from land 
areas under the control of a CAFO is an agricultural 
stormwater discharge. 
Id. It might appear on first glance that CAFO land application 
activities can only qualify as agricultural stormwater discharges 
if they meet the criteria described in section 122.23(e). However, 
a further reading reveals otherwise. Immediately following the 
text quoted above, 122.23(e)(1) states: 
 
[f]or unpermitted Large CAFOs, a precipitation-related 
discharge of manure . . . from land areas under the control 
of a CAFO shall be considered an agricultural stormwater 
discharge only where [it] . . . has been land applied in 
accordance with site-specific nutrient management 
practices that ensure appropriate agricultural utilization 
of the nutrients in the manure . . . as specified in § 
122.42(e)(1)(vi) through (ix).6 
 
Id. § 122.23(e)(1) (emphasis added). 
Section 122.23(e)(1) makes it clear that for Large CAFOs, 
there is only one way that land application discharges can be 
considered agricultural stormwater discharges: when the CAFO 
conducts land application activities “in accordance with site 
specific nutrient management practices that ensure appropriate 
agricultural utilization of the nutrients. . .as specified in § 
122.42(e)(1)(vi)-(ix).” Id. But for Medium CAFOs, there is no 
parallel to section 122.23(e)(1); there is only the main text of 
section 122.23(e). When the main text of 122.23(e) is read 
alongside of 122.23(e)(1), the inescapable conclusion is that for 
Medium CAFOs, land application activities conducted in 
accordance with site specific nutrient management practices 
 
 6. “Unpermitted” means the CAFO is not subject to NPDES permitting by 
virtue of discharges outside of those exempt as agricultural stormwater. If a 
CAFO is subject to NPDES permitting (either due to non-land application 
discharges or land application discharges that don’t qualify for the agricultural 
stormwater exemption), then it must submit an NMP satisfying additional 
criteria beyond what is provided by § 122.42(e)(1)(vi)-(ix), and the NMP would 
be subject to the public comment process. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.42(e) (2014); id. § 
124.10. 
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conforming to § 122.42(e)(1)(vi)-(ix) will guarantee that the 
discharges are considered agricultural stormwater, but it is not 
the exclusive way for discharges to be considered agricultural 
stormwater. 
If Moon Moo Farm was found to be a CAFO, it could only be a 
Medium CAFO because its 350 cow dairy herd is far below the 
minimum 700 mature dairy cows or 1,000 other cattle required to 
be a Large CAFO. See id. § 122.23(b)(4). Therefore, Moon Moo 
would not be required to show that its land application activities 
are conducted in accordance with site specific nutrient 
management practices that conform to § 122.42(e)(1)(vi)-(ix). Id. § 
122.23(e). 
Other than the guarantee provided when a CAFO ensures 
“appropriate agricultural utilization of the nutrients,” section 
122.23(e) does not indicate when discharges from Medium CAFO 
land application activities qualify as agricultural stormwater 
runoff. Furthermore, the CWA does not define agricultural 
stormwater runoff. When statutes and regulations are silent as to 
the meaning of a term, courts must give the term its “ordinary 
meaning in accordance with common usage.” Alt v. EPA, 979 F. 
Supp. 2d 701, 710-11 (N.D. W. Va. 2013) (citing BP v. Burton, 549 
U.S. 84, 91, 127 (2006)). 
Assuming that Moon Moo was a Medium CAFO, the analysis 
for whether its land application discharges would be exempt as 
agricultural stormwater runoff is the same as the non-CAFO 
plain meaning analysis conducted in section I.B.1 above. Based 
on the ordinary meaning of agricultural stormwater discharge 
and the analysis conducted above, the discharges from Moon Moo 
Farm would be exempt from NPDES permitting. 
 
 
 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol6/iss1/5
  
2015] BEST BRIEF: OVERALL 137 
 
 
3.    Neither the levels of nitrates and fecal 
coliforms nor the discharge of the stormwater 
through a drainage ditch change the 
conclusion that Moon Moo’s nutrient 
discharges are agricultural stormwater 
discharges not subject to NPDES permitting. 
Riverwatcher claims that the samples they took from Moon 
Moo’s ditch had highly elevated levels of nitrates and fecal 
coliforms. (R. 6). Dr. Mae asserts that the manure’s acidity 
discouraged nutrient absorption and that “land application of 
manure during a rain event is a very poor management practice” 
that will almost always result in “excess runoff of nutrients from 
fields.” Id. Riverwatcher’s reliance on these facts is misplaced. 
The purpose of the agricultural stormwater exemption is to 
exclude certain sources of pollution from NPDES permitting 
coverage. This means pollution (whether from excess runoff of 
nutrients or other sources) is expected in any exempt discharge, 
otherwise there would be no need to invoke the exemption. 
There is no basis for taking the magnitude of Moon Moo’s 
discharge into account for situations outside of a Large CAFO 
covered by section 122.23(e)(1). 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 (e)(1) (2014). 
Whether a discharge falls within the ordinary meaning of 
agricultural stormwater depends on whether it results from 
precipitation, not on its magnitude. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 
121. 
Lastly, the existence of a ditch as the mechanism for 
transferring Moon Moo’s agricultural stormwater discharges into 
waters of the United States has no bearing on the discharges’ 
status as agricultural stormwater discharges. Agricultural 
stormwater discharges are those resulting from precipitation, and 
they are still exempt “even when those discharges came from 
what would otherwise be point sources.” Waterkeeper Alliance, 
Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 507 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Concerned 
Area Residents for Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 
1994); Alt v. EPA, 979 F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D. W. Va. 2013) 
(illustrating that discharges from CAFOs, which are statutorily 
defined as point sources, are considered agricultural stormwater 
runoff when they result from precipitation). Because the 
discharges here result from precipitation and are therefore 
17
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exempt stormwater discharges, it is irrelevant that a ditch is the 
mechanism for transferring Moon Moo’s discharges into waters of 
the United States. 
4.    Moon Moo’s application of manure in 
accordance with its nutrient management plan 
(NMP) provides additional support that its 
discharges are exempt as agricultural 
stormwater. 
New Union regulates Moon Moo Farm as a “no-discharge” 
AFO. (R. 5). Being a “no-discharge” operation means Moon Moo 
should not normally have direct manure discharges. Id. Per its 
regulatory requirements, Moon Moo submitted a nutrient 
management plan (NMP) to the New Union Department of 
Agriculture (DOA). Id. The NMP provided planned seasonal 
manure application rates and a calculation of expected uptake of 
nutrients by the crops grown on the fields where the manure was 
spread. Id. Moon Moo’s manure land applications have been 
conducted in accordance with its NMP at all times relevant to 
this case. (R. 6). 
As explained above in sections I.A and I.B.2, Moon Moo need 
not submit an NMP for its land application discharges to be 
classified as agricultural stormwater under 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e) 
because (1) it is not a CAFO, and (2) even if it were a CAFO, it 
would be an unpermitted Medium CAFO, and only unpermitted 
Large CAFOs are limited to an NMP as the exclusive option for 
receiving the agricultural stormwater exemption. Instead, Moon 
Moo’s discharges are exempt if they fall within the plain meaning 
of an agricultural stormwater discharge (which they do). 
But the New Union DOA’s acceptance of Moon Moo’s NMP 
does provide additional support that Moon Moo’s land 
applications are agricultural stormwater discharges. This is 
because Moon Moo submitted its NMP as a no-discharge 
operation under New Union’s regulatory scheme, which means 
land applications in accordance with the NMP should not result 
in direct manure discharges. If Moon Moo’s land applications do 
not result in direct manure discharges, then their discharges with 
excess nutrients must be the result of precipitation and fall 
within the plain meaning of agricultural stormwater discharges. 
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Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 
114, 121 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Alt v. EPA, 979 F. Supp. 2d 701, 
711 (N.D. W. Va. 2013) (interpreting the plain meaning of 
stormwater discharges to be “precipitation-related discharges”). 
Therefore, New Union’s acceptance of Moon Moo’s NMP supports 
the district court’s conclusion that Moon Moo’s discharges result 
from precipitation and are exempt from NPDES permitting as 
agricultural stormwater discharges. 
II.  MOON MOO FARM’S APPLICATION OF SOIL 
AMENDMENTS DOES NOT VIOLATE RCRA 
BECAUSE THE MANURE AND WHEY NEITHER 
CONSTITUTE SOLID WASTE NOR REPRESENT 
AN IMMINENT AND SUBSTANTIAL 
ENDANGERMENT TO HUMAN HEALTH OR THE 
ENVRIONMENT 
Congress drafted the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) in 1976 to deal with escalating waste disposal 
problems throughout the United States. Congress also expressly 
noted its desire to create “a national system to insure the safe 
management of hazardous waste.” American Mining Congress v. 
EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (herein AMC I) (citing 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, at 3 (1976), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., 
1976). Congress intended RCRA to apply to both hazardous and 
non-hazardous solid wastes; RCRA does not, however, apply to 
every potential environmental harm. RCRA entered a regulatory 
universe already populated by the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. § 
1251 et seq., 1972) and Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., 
1970). RCRA Subtitle D, which deals with nonhazardous solid 
waste disposal, defines solid waste as: 
garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water 
supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other 
discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or 
contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, 
commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from 
community activities. . . 
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42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2012) (emphasis added).7 Riverwatcher 
asserts that Moon Moo violated several open dumping provisions 
and created an “imminent and substantial endangerment to 
human health.” (R. 10). Both claims first require Riverwatcher to 
establish that the material at issue qualifies as solid waste, 
specifically as “other discarded material” from “agricultural 
operations.” Id. 
Since Moon Moo’s land application of whey and manure does 
not qualify as solid waste disposal, the district court properly 
dismissed both claims. Even if Moon Moo disposed of solid waste, 
Riverwatcher failed to connect Moon Moo’s practices to any 
“imminent and substantial endangerment.” 42 U.S.C. § 
6972(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
A. Moon Moo Farm’s soil amendments do not qualify 
as discarded material.8 
RCRA’s definition of solid waste includes both specific 
categories (e.g., “garbage, refuse,” and “sludge”) and more general 
descriptions (e.g., “other discarded material”) 42 U.S.C. § 
6903(27) (2012). While it might appear that the inclusion of 
“other discarded material” makes the definition broad in scope, 
Congress in fact defined solid waste narrowly. Based on the 
doctrine of ejusdem generis, a general category that appears 
immediately following an enumerated list should apply only to 
“things of the same general class as those enumerated.” AMC I, 
824 F.2d at 1189. Riverwatcher asserts that the manure and 
whey constitute other discarded material. (R. 11). To determine 
whether a material has been discarded, courts consider the 
statute’s plain text, legislative history, and the operator’s 
purpose. See Safe Air v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2004). 
In Safe Air v. Meyer, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether 
blue grass residue left on a field and then burned after the 
harvest qualified as a solid waste. Meyer, 373 F.3d at 1037. This 
practice is known as “open field burning.” Id. The remaining ash 
restored necessary nutrients to the soil, fertilized future crops, 
 
 7. Riverwatcher does not allege that Moon Moo has disposed of hazardous 
waste, governed by RCRA Subtitle C. (R. 10). 
 8. If Moon Moo qualifies as a point source under the CWA, RCRA expressly 
excludes it from regulation under Subtitle D. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). 
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and reduced the need for artificial pesticides by deterring insects. 
Id. at 1044. Open field burning enabled productive use of the 
fields for a much longer period of time. Id. As described below, the 
Meyer court’s approach demonstrates analysis of the term 
“discarded material” consistent with the statutory text, Congress’ 
intent, and consideration of operator purpose. 
1.    The plain meaning of “other discarded 
materials” does not encompass manure and 
whey applied to the land for a beneficial 
purpose. 
Under traditional cannons of statutory construction, courts 
should first look to the statutory language selected by Congress. 
CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 377 (1981). The statute’s meaning 
relies foremost on the common meaning of its words; “unless 
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their 
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Meyer, 373 F.3d at 
1041 (internal citation omitted). This begins with the 
understanding that “the legislative purpose is expressed by the 
ordinary meaning of the words used.” Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of 
Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 149 (1984). Since Congress did not 
define “other discarded material,” courts should look to the plain 
meaning and dictionary definition of “discarded.” Meyer, 373 F.3d 
at 1041. Discarded imparts an understanding that the material 
has been “disposed of, thrown away or abandoned.” AMC I, 824 
F.2d at 1183 (internal citation omitted). 
The common meaning of discarded comports with the waste 
disposal problems that inspired Congress to enact RCRA. The 
AMC I court looked both to plain meaning and Congress’s intent 
to determine that material has not been discarded when intended 
for “immediate reuse.” Id. at 1184-85. The D.C. Circuit 
summarized Congress’s intent as “extend[ing] EPA’s authority 
only to materials that are truly discarded, disposed of, thrown 
away, or abandoned.” Id. at 1190. Materials “destined for 
beneficial reuse” play no role in the waste disposal problem that 
inspired RCRA. Id. at 1186. This framework does not encompass 
beneficial use of manure and whey. Common sense dictates that 
the use of soil amendments to increase crop yields does not 
21
  
142 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE  [Vol.  6 
 
 
equate to waste disposal under the common meaning of the term 
“discarded.” 
2.    Congress intended RCRA to apply primarily to 
truly discarded material, especially waste in 
landfills. 
Especially in context of contemporaneous environmental 
regulation, Congress sought to “eliminate[ ] the last remaining 
loophole in environmental law, that of unregulated land disposal 
of discarded materials and hazardous wastes.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-
1491, at 4 (1976). Since RCRA’s initial enactment: 
 
neither Congress, nor EPA’s implementing regulations, ever 
contemplated that application of manure and other solid 
amendments to agricultural fields would be considered a solid 
waste disposal practice subject to regulation under RCRA. 
(R. 10). When promulgating RCRA, Congress referred to the 
“‘rising tide’ in scrap, discarded, and waste materials” as well as 
the need “to provide for proper and economical solid waste 
disposal practices.” AMC I, 824 F.2d at 1179 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
6901(a)(2) and (a)(4)). Reuse of animal manure and whey as soil 
amendments does not implicate the concerns that motivated 
Congress to enact RCRA. 
An accompanying House Report describes RCRA as “a multi-
faceted approach toward solving the problems associated with the 
3-4 billion tons of discarded materials generated each year.” H.R. 
REP. NO. 94-1491, at 2 (1976). Congress sought to spur “[a]n 
increase in reclamation and reuse practices.” Id. at 3. Application 
of soil amendments represents the very type of recycling practice 
that Congress sought to encourage. The same report indicates 
that “[a]gricultural wastes which are returned to the soil as 
fertilizers . . . are not considered discarded materials in the sense 
of this legislation.” Id. Moon Moo’s conduct already qualifies as 
the type of reuse and reclamation practice Congress sought to 
encourage by promulgating RCRA. 
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3.    Moon Moo’s purpose in applying whey and 
manure to the fields pursuant to a valid 
Nutrient Management Plan indicates that the 
soil amendments are not discarded. 
Finally, courts consider “whether the party intended to throw 
the material away or put it to a beneficial use.” Safe Food & 
Fertilizer v. EPA, 350 F.3d 1263, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2003). This 
process has been described as “a functional inquiry,” focused on 
“defendants’ use of the animal waste products rather than the 
agriculture waste definition.” Water Keeper Alliance, Inc. v. 
Smithfield Foods, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21314, at *12 
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2001). The same is true even if the material is 
destined for reuse in a different industry. Safe Food, 350 F.3d at 
1268. The fact that Moon Moo acquires its whey from Chokos 
without cost does not impact the analysis of Moon Moo’s intent in 
applying the whey to its fields. Moon Moo’s primary purpose in 
returning the mixture to the soil is to improve the soil condition. 
(R. 6). Use of soil amendments supports Moon Moo’s increase in 
operations to accommodate Chokos’ heightened demand. (R. 5). 
As far as whey, “land application of whey as a soil conditioner 
was a longstanding practice that has been traditional in New 
Union since the 1940s.” (R. 6). Moon Moo’s use comports with 
farming practices in place long before RCRA. Even though 
Chokos provides the whey at no cost, that does not mean Moon 
Moo intends to discard it. (R. 5). In fact, it is inconceivable that 
Moon Moo would accept Chokos’s whey for mere disposal if it did 
not serve a beneficial purpose to Moon Moo. The operator in 
Meyer also did not receive payment for the grass residue, but that 
did not transform beneficial use into waste disposal. See generally 
Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035. Although Chokos does not receive money 
for its whey, it benefits from Moon Moo’s increased capacity. 
In addition to RCRA’s plain language and Congress’s intent, 
Meyer looked at the operator’s intent. Meyer, 373 F.3d at 1045. 
There, blue grass residue was an “integral component in the open 
burning process” that provided many benefits. Id. at 1043. 
Similarly, Moon Moo applies whey and manure as part of its 
Nutrient Management Plan (NMP). (R. 5–6). Existence of an 
NMP reinforces the validity of an operator’s beneficial use. In 
Oklahoma, the operator complied with an Animal Waste 
23
  
144 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE  [Vol.  6 
 
 
Management Plan (AWMP) when applying poultry litter as a soil 
amendment. Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14941, at *21-22 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 17, 2010). Existing 
regulations showed that Oklahoma endorsed the beneficial use. 
Oklahoma, at *42. 
Moon Moo Farm submitted its NMP to the New Union 
Department of Agriculture (DOA), which has authority to reject 
NMPs (R. 5). The NMP details the rate at which Moon Moo may 
apply the amendments to its fields and outlines the projected 
nutrient uptake of the crops. Id. Even if some aspect of the 
material is not fully used, that does not transform it into 
discarded material. Oklahoma, at *43. Animal waste can become 
discarded when applied in excessive quantities; however, 
Riverwatcher has not shown that Moon Moo excessively applied 
soil amendments. See Water Keeper Alliance, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21314. To the contrary, Moon Moo applies the whey and 
cow manure to its fields in compliance with its NMP. (R. 6).9 
Farmers commonly use animal manure as a soil amendment 
or share it with others for that purpose. Oklahoma, at *20. 
Congress acknowledged this practice and explicitly excluded 
“agricultural wastes, including manures . . . returned to the soil 
as fertilizers or soil conditioners” from RCRA. 40 C.F.R. § 
257.1(c)(1); see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, at 3. Oklahoma argued 
that poultry waste applied to fields qualified as “other discarded 
material” from agricultural operations, despite its many 
beneficial uses. Oklahoma, at *40-1. Poultry litter constituted “an 
agricultural commodity for which there [was] both a market and 
a market value” as opposed to unwanted waste. Id. at *33. 
In another manure case, the plaintiffs alleged that manure 
“applied to agricultural fields at above-argonomic levels and 
leaked from lagoons storing manure” qualified as discarded. 
Cmty. Ass’n for the Restoration of the Env’t v. George & Margaret 
LLC, 964 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1154 (E.D. Wash. 2013). This resulted 
in high levels of nitrates in drinking water. Id. at 1154. The court 
looked to Meyer and cited the ordinary meaning of discarded, “to 
 
 9. Riverwatcher contends that Moon Moo’s NMP is not subject to public 
comment, however, any dispute with the NMP should be pursued through 
administrative process at the DOA and not in this proceeding. Further, RCRA 
does not speak to any specific criteria for valid NMPs. 
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cast aside; reject; abandon; give up.” Id. at 1156 (internal citation 
omitted). Another key factor was “whether that product ‘has 
served its intended purpose and is no longer wanted by the 
consumer.’” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 
713 F.3d 502, 515 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, 
at 2). 
Even if Moon Moo’s soil amendments qualify as solid waste, 
Moon Moo has not violated RCRA’s open dumping provisions 
because those “criteria do not apply to agricultural wastes, 
including manures and crop residues, returned to the soil as 
fertilizers or soil conditioners.” 40 C.F.R. § 257.1(c)(1). Moon Moo 
has not applied its soil amendments in excessive quantities, and 
has complied with a valid NMP at all times. (R. 6). Moon Moo’s 
good faith compliance evidences its intent to improve its farm. 
B. Moon Moo Farm’s untested contribution to 
elevated nitrate levels does not rise to the level of 
an “imminent and substantial” threat to human 
health. 
Riverwatcher next asserts that Moon Moo disposed of solid 
waste so as to create an “imminent and substantial 
endangerment to human health or the environment.” (R. 11) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2012)). The endangerment 
alleged relies on Farmville Water Authority (FWA)’s decision to 
issue a drinking water advisory due to “highly elevated levels of 
nitrates and fecal coliforms.” (R. 6). FWA warned residents that 
nitrate levels “made the Farmville municipal water supply unsafe 
for drinking by infants” and recommended that infants receive 
bottled water. Id. Even though RCRA embodies a forgiving 
standard, Riverwatcher failed either to link Moon Moo’s conduct 
to the advisory or to establish a sufficient threat of actual harm to 
community residents. 
1.    Riverwatcher has not established a sufficient 
causal link between Moon Moo’s activities and 
the nitrate advisories. 
The district court properly granted summary judgment in 
Moon Moo’s favor because Riverwatcher failed to establish a 
causal link between Moon Moo and the nitrate advisories. In fact, 
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“Riverwatcher’s own expert conceded that Moon Moo Farm’s 
practices are not the ‘but-for’ cause of the nitrate advisories.” (R. 
11). The Farmville Water Authority issued similar advisories “in 
2002, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010, before the increase in Moon 
Moo Farm’s operations.” (R. 7). These advisories also predate 
Moon Moo’s acceptance of whey from Chokos. (R. 5). Moon Moo’s 
conduct has not altered the length of time between advisories, 
which ranges from one to four years. (R. 7). Moon Moo’s increased 
capacity appears to have no impact at all on the issuance of 
nitrate advisories in Farmville or their frequency. Furthermore, 
“the Deep Quod watershed is heavily farmed.” Id. No other 
parties potentially responsible for nitrate pollution have been 
joined to this suit. Without these parties, it is unlikely that any 
judgment against Moon Moo would substantially impact nitrate 
levels in the watershed. 
In Steilacoom Lake Improvement Club, Inc. v. Washington, 
the Ninth Circuit held that elevated phosphorous levels in a lake 
that lead to water quality violations did not pose an imminent 
danger to resident health or the environment. 138 Fed. Appx. 
929, 932 (9th Cir. 2005). Similarly to Riverwatcher, the 
Steilacoom plaintiffs failed to establish a causal link between the 
defendant’s conduct and phosphorous level in the lake. Id. at 932. 
Plaintiffs would need to establish “how much excess phosphorous 
is contributed by any of the many other watershed property 
owners” to establish causation. Id. Riverwatcher has not even 
identified other possible contributors to nitrate levels in the 
watershed. 
2.    Nitrate advisories create no imminent risk of 
harm in Farmville. 
Although RCRA’s standard extends to conduct that “may” 
present a risk to human health or the environment, the potential 
harm must be imminent. This does not require a showing of 
actual harm, but requires “a threat which is present now.” Price 
v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(emphasis original). Under RCRA’s imminence requirement the 
mere fact of contamination does not establish causation. In 
Scotchtown Holdings, LLC v. Goshen, a New York district court 
noted that “courts often dismiss RCRA claims where, 
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notwithstanding the existence of hazardous substances in a water 
supply, the specific factual circumstances at issue prevent 
humans from actually drinking contaminated water.” 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1656, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2009). The FWA’s 
advisement to use bottled water for infants sufficiently protects 
human health and neutralizes the risk of actual harm. 
The Fourth Circuit similarly denied a RCRA claim based on 
hazardous substances found in groundwater and wells near a 
manufacturing facility. Leister v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 16961, at *8 (4th Cir. Jul. 8, 1997). 
Although the contaminants unmistakably posed a serious threat, 
Black & Decker previously entered into a consent order to install 
a filtration mechanism. Id. at *4. As a result, the court found no 
risk of imminent exposure, and concluded that relief under RCRA 
was not warranted. Id. at *8. Even alternatives far less 
sophisticated than installing a filtration mechanism can 
adequately curtail the risk. 
In Davies v. Nat’l Coop. Refinery Ass’n, the alleged 
endangerment consisted of hydrocarbon pollution in well water 
that supplied a local radio station. 963 F. Supp. 990, 992 (D. Kan. 
1997). Experts calculated “the carcinogenic health risk to 
individuals exposed to water from the old and new wells, 
respectively, to be 650 and 219 times greater than acceptable.” Id. 
at 996. Evidence did not “establish or address the likelihood that 
any person will actually be exposed to” the contaminated water. 
Id. at 999. The court opined, “plaintiffs have been warned of the 
danger and are able to occupy the property without serious risk to 
their health by using an alternative water supply.” Id. RCRA’s 
purpose of avoiding harm to human health does not transform it 
into a broad remedial statute. Since Farmville residents can 
avoid any possible health hazard by using bottled water for 
infants, no imminent risk of harm exists. The FWA has issued 
nitrate advisories multiple times in the past. The record does not 
indicate any instance where the FWA failed to alert residents to 
possible risks posed by elevated nitrate levels. 
The risk to Farmville residents is also far less serious than 
other instances where courts have denied relief under RCRA. 
Courts generally conclude that an endangerment is substantial 
when it is “serious.” Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 
399 F.3d 248, 259 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Price, 39 F.3d 1011. In 
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Interfaith, a concrete risk of actual exposure informed the court’s 
conclusion that the risk was serious. Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 261. 
Amounts of hexavalent chromium indisputably attributable to 
Honeywell “exceeded all applicable . . . contamination standards 
for soil, groundwater, surface water, and river sediments adjacent 
to the Site.” Id. Containment measures exhibited damage and 
leaks, and Interfaith also produced “evidence of human trespass . 
. . including holes and damage to the Site’s fence and . . . 
discarded food and wrappers, toys, fishing poles and equipment, 
and graffiti.” Id. at 262. Both the seriousness of the harm and 
potential for actual exposure differ significantly from the FWA’s 
nitrate advisories. The nitrate advisory impacts a small, readily 
identifiable subset of Farmville’s population—infants less than 
two years of age. This allows the FWA to warn affected 
individuals before any actual exposure takes place. Unlike 
attempting to close off an area to trespassers, provision of bottled 
water is an alternative guaranteed to prevent exposure. 
Since Riverwatcher failed to establish a causal link between 
Moon Moo’s application of soil amendments and the nitrate 
advisory, and failed to establish that the threat is both imminent 
and substantial, the district court properly granted summary 
judgment in Moon Moo’s favor. Even if the danger were imminent 
and substantial, Riverwatcher has not shown that injunctive 
relief against Moon Moo would have any impact on nitrate levels 
in the Deep Quod watershed. 
III. THE QUEECHUNK CANAL IS NOT A PUBLIC 
TRUST NAVIGABLE WATER OF THE STATE OF 
NEW UNION BECAUSE IT IS NOT A WATER IN 
ITS NATURAL STATE AND HAS NO PUBLIC 
RIGHT OF ACCESS. 
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution 
gives the federal government power “to regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Early on, the Supreme 
Court held that the government’s power to regulate commerce 
included regulation of activities related to navigation. Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 3 (1824). After Gibbons, the question became 
the scope of navigability. The navigability test in The Daniel Ball, 
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decided by the Supreme Court in 1870, remains the standard 
used by the federal government to determine navigability for 
Commerce Clause purposes. There, the court held that “rivers are 
navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being 
used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over 
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary 
modes of trade and travel on water.” The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 
557, 563 (1870). The court subsequently expanded the scope of 
navigability to include waters that have been improved to allow 
for navigability. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 
311 U.S. 377, 407 (1940). 
However, an important distinction exists between a river’s 
navigability for Commerce Clause purposes and its navigability 
for title purposes because the Commerce Clause “speaks in terms 
of power, not of property.” United States v. Twin City Power Co., 
350 U.S. 222, 224 (1956). This means that a water body’s 
navigability simply gives the federal government regulatory 
power over the water. Title of the beds and banks of navigable 
waters, however, rests in the states as sovereigns. Shively v. 
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 31 (1894).10 In order for a water body to be 
navigable for state title purposes, the water body must have been 
navigable at the time of statehood, based on the “natural and 
ordinary condition of the water.” PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 
1228. Upon admission to the Union, title passes to the state, “as 
incident to the transfer to the state of local sovereignty, and is 
subject only to the paramount power of the United States to 
control such waters for purposes of navigation in interstate and 
foreign commerce.” United States v. State of Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 
14 (1935). 
 
 10. This rule originates from English common law. PPL Montana, LLC v. 
Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1226 (2012). After the American Revolution, the 
newly formed United States adopted the same rule: “the people of each state 
became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to 
all their navigable waters, and the soils under them, for their own common use, 
subject only to the rights since surrendered by the constitution to the general 
government.” Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842). The same 
principle was true for each state thereafter admitted to the Union because the 
states are coequal sovereigns under the Constitution. Lessee of Pollard v. 
Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 231 (1845). This principle came to be known as the equal 
footing doctrine. Id. at 216. 
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The Queechunk Canal was constructed in the 1940s by the 
previous owner of Moon Moo’s property. (R. 5). New Union 
became a state before that time. (R. 4). Since New Union became 
a state before the Queechunk Canal existed, the bed and banks of 
the current canal cannot be owned by the State of New Union. In 
these instances, as the Supreme Court stated, “if they were not 
then navigable, the title to the river beds remained in the United 
States.” United States v. State of Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931). 
A. The Queechunk Canal is not a navigable water 
body because it is not in its natural state and is not 
used for commercial purposes. 
The long held test for navigability of waterways is that 
“rivers are navigable in fact when they are used, or are 
susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways 
for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be 
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.” 
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563. 
The Queechunk Canal, as a man-made canal, cannot be 
considered navigable under the Daniel Ball test because it is not 
a water body in its ordinary condition. The farm’s previous owner 
created the entire canal where there was none before. In addition, 
there is no evidence that the canal has ever been used 
commercially. It was constructed to alleviate flooding at the 
nearby bend in the Deep Quod River. (R. at 5). The canal’s creator 
used private resources to protect his property against flood 
damage. The canal’s creator never intended that it be used for 
commerce and, in fact, prominently posted signs declaring no 
trespassing.  Id. 
Because the canal is not a navigable waterway, the public 
trust doctrine does not apply. Therefore, no public right of 
navigation exists on the Queechunk Canal, and James committed 
trespass when he entered the canal. 
B. Even if the Queechunk Canal were navigable, there 
is no public right of access because the canal was 
privately constructed. 
The private construction of the Queechunk Canal exempts it 
from being subject to a public right of access. Furthermore, while 
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the federal government has authority over navigable waters for 
commerce purposes, that authority does not entitle it to control 
the water for title purposes. This establishes only the right to 
control use of navigable waters in the United States. As the 
Supreme Court held in Twin City Power Co.: 
 
‘[t]he interest of the United States in the flow of a navigable 
stream originates in the Commerce Clause. That Clause 
speaks in terms of power, not of property. But the power is a 
dominant one which can be asserted to the exclusion of any 
competing or conflicting one. The power is a privilege which 
we have called ‘a dominant servitude’ or ‘a superior 
navigation easement.’ 
United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224-25 
(1956). In Kaiser Aetna, owners of an artificially constructed 
marina, Kuapa Pond, sought to deny public access. When owners 
made the necessary improvements to create a fully functioning 
marina, it was declared to be navigable by the Army Corps of 
Engineers. The Ninth Circuit held that the federal navigation 
servitude obligated the marina to allow public access since the 
marina became navigable. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 
164, 166 (1979). The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit 
and held that while “it is true that Kuapa Pond may fit within 
definitions of ‘navigability’ articulated in past decisions of this 
Court . . . it must be recognized that the concept of navigability in 
these decisions was used for purposes other than to delimit the 
boundaries of the navigational servitude.” Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 
at 171. The Court found that the concept of navigability had been 
used only to: 
 
define the scope of Congress’s regulatory authority under the 
Interstate Commerce Clause, to determine the extent of the 
authority of the Corps of Engineers . . . and to establish the 
limits of the jurisdiction of federal courts conferred by Art. III, 
§ 2, of the United States Constitution over admiralty and 
maritime cases. 
Id. The Court went on to say that creating a public right of access 
after private owners improved Kuapa Pond would constitute a 
taking contrary to the Fifth Amendment. 
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Like in Kaiser Aetna, Moon Moo owns a privately constructed 
water body that, but for private investment, would not be 
navigable. “If a waterway is a ‘navigable water of the United 
States,’ the federal government has the power to subject it to 
exclusive federal regulation, at least with respect to navigation 
issues.” Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Is a Navigable Water? Canoes 
Count but Kayaks Do Not, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1067, 1070 
(2003). The federal government certainly has power to regulate 
aspects of the canal, including Coast Guard jurisdiction over 
navigation safety, Army Corps of Engineers authority to regulate 
structural and obstruction issues, and Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission authority to regulate dams. Id. 
Even if the Queechunk Canal can be considered federally 
navigable, the government cannot compel it to open the canal to 
public navigation without affecting a taking. A private party 
developed the canal for the sole purpose of alleviating flooding at 
the bend of the Deep Quod River, where a large portion of Moon 
Moo Farm is located.  (R. 5). This flood reduction mechanism 
served to help protect the farm’s property from damage. The Fifth 
Amendment to the United Sates Constitution provides, “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment 
prohibits granting public access to the Queechunk Canal without 
just compensation. In this case, there is no evidence that Moon 
Moo’s owners received just compensation for a public right of 
access on the canal. To allow a public right of access contravene 
Kaiser Aetna, intended to protect private property owners against 
unconstitutional government takings. 
In conclusion, Moon Moo argues that the Queechunk Canal is 
not subject to public trust navigation because it is not a navigable 
waterway.  Even if the court can find navigability, while the 
federal government clearly has some regulatory power over the 
Queechunk Canal, it does not have the right to declare the canal 
navigable for public access purposes.  Without just compensation, 
opening the Queechunk Canal to public access is an 
unconstitutional taking contrary to the Fifth Amendment. 
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IV. BECAUSE THE QUEECHUNK CANAL DOES NOT 
HAVE A PUBLIC RIGHT OF ACCESS, AND 
BECAUSE OF A BREAK IN THE EVIDENTIARY 
CHAIN OF CUSTODY, EVIDENCE OBTAINED 
THROUGH TRESPASS AND WITHOUT A 
WARRANT IS INADMISSIBLE. 
Moon Moo rejects the authenticity of evidence presented by 
James and EPA. As the Ninth Circuit held in Black, a court 
reviews a lower court’s decision to admit certain evidence for 
abuse of discretion. United States v. Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1342 
(9th Cir. 1985). The same circuit previously held that the 
proponent bears the burden of establishing chain of custody, to 
the satisfaction of the trial judge. Gallego v. United States, 276 
F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1960). Riverwatcher has not established 
“sufficient proof so that a reasonable juror could find that the 
[evidence is] in ‘substantially the same condition’ as when” first 
obtained. United States v. Harrington, 923 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th 
Cir. 1991). Courts consider the nature of the article, 
circumstances surrounding its preservation and custody, and the 
likelihood of intermeddlers tampering with it. Gallego, 276 F.2d 
at 917. Moon Moo points specifically to the circumstances 
surrounding preservation and custody as well as the likelihood of 
tampering. 
A.    Evidence is inadmissible because of a break in the 
chain of custody. 
Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states, “[t]o satisfy 
the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of 
evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it 
is.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). This rule applies equally in civil cases. 
Fed. R. Evid. 101.  The above rule, better known as the “chain of 
custody” rule “is but a variation of the principle that real evidence 
must be authenticated prior to its admission into evidence.” 
United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 1982). 
“The purpose of this threshold requirement is to establish that 
the item to be introduced is what it purports to be.” Id. The 
Second Circuit held that the object must be shown to be in 
substantially the same condition as when the crime was 
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committed before it can be admitted as evidence. United States v. 
S.B. Penick & Co., 136 F.2d 413, 415 (2d Cir. 1943). “This can be 
accomplished by showing a ‘chain of custody,’ which indirectly 
establishes the identity and integrity of the evidence by tracing 
its continuous whereabouts. Or such evidence may be visually 
identified by witnesses.” United States v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511, 514 
(10th Cir. 1980). The Howard-Arias court developed the idea 
further, holding that a missing link in the chain of evidence does 
not necessarily preclude the evidence as long as there is sufficient 
proof that the evidence is what it purports to be and has not been 
altered.  Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d at 366. Resolution of this 
question rests with the sound discretion of the trial judge. Id. 
The record shows that James collected samples and 
submitted them to a lab. (R. at 6). However, there is no 
verification that the samples from the river are substantially the 
same as the samples Riverwatcher sought to admit. While a 
break in the chain of custody does not necessarily bar admission 
of evidence, there must be sufficient proof that the evidence is 
what it purports to be. Howard-Arias, 679 F. 2d. at 366. Since the 
proponent bears the burden of proof, James must verify that the 
evidence has not been tampered with in any way. This proof does 
not exist and the trial court, after James failed to produce this 
evidence, properly excluded the evidence.  Moon Moo also 
contends that James had a motive to tamper with the evidence. 
The fact that evidence may be identified by witnesses is not a 
valid defense here for two reasons. First, one witness could 
undoubtedly be a staff member from the laboratory that analyzed 
the samples; however, the court cannot be sure that the samples 
tested in the lab were taken directly from the canal without 
tampering. Second, one of the witnesses, James, is the same 
person who collected the evidence and has a clear motive to be 
untruthful. James’s affiliation with an environmental group, and 
the fact that he is party to this litigation, is a reasonable motive 
for tampering with any alleged samples collected from the 
Queechunk Canal.  As the Deep Quod Riverwatcher, it is 
reasonably assumed that his goal to ensure that the river’s water 
remains clean. This directive serves enough of a motive to stop a 
perceived threat to the river by hindering the operations of 
nearby agriculture. 
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In summary, the water samples collected by James are not 
admissible because the chain of causation was broken with no 
verification that the proffered evidence is what it purports to be. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Moon Moo Farm does not require a NPDES permit because it 
is a CAFO. Even if it were, its discharges qualify as exempt 
agricultural stormwater discharges. Moon Moo’s application of 
soil amendments does not violate RCRA because the amendments 
are not solid waste. Moon Moo’s conduct also has not created an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to human health. The 
district court properly awarded damages for and excluded 
evidence procured by trespass on Moon Moo’s private property. 
Therefore this Court should AFFIRM the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment to Moon Moo Farm and denial of summary 
judgment to both Riverwatcher and EPA. 
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